Ontario Statutory Interpretation — Modern Purposive Approach

The Modern Principle

Canadian statutory interpretation is governed by the "modern principle" articulated by Elmer Driedger and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re) [1998] 1 SCR 27 (Iacobucci J):

"Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament."

This modern purposive approach displaced the older schools — the "literal rule" (plain meaning regardless of outcome) and the "mischief rule" (what mischief was the statute meant to cure?). The modern principle integrates all three sources of meaning simultaneously: text, context, and purpose.

Ontario's Legislation Act 2006 SO 2006 c 21 Sch F codifies the modern approach for provincial statutes at s.64: "An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects." This is the Ontario equivalent of the federal Interpretation ActRSC 1985 c I-21 s.12.

Textual Analysis — The Starting Point

Despite the modern principle's integration of text, context, and purpose, analysis begins with the text. As the Supreme Court confirmed in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v Rex [2002] 2 SCR 559 (Iacobucci J), where the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, that is the end of the matter — they must be applied without recourse to other aids of interpretation.

Key textual analysis principles:

• •Ordinary meaning: words are given their ordinary grammatical meaning unless the statute provides a definition or context indicates a technical meaning. Dictionaries are an appropriate tool for ordinary meaning but are not conclusive.
• •Technical/legal terms: terms with established legal meaning are presumed to carry that meaning. "Hearsay," "mortgage," "easement" — courts apply the legal definition unless excluded by context.
• •Contextual coherence: the same word in the same statute is presumed to have the same meaning throughout. Different words in the same section are presumed to have different meanings (implied exclusion).
• •Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others. If a list specifies A, B, and C, D is presumed excluded.
• •Ejusdem generis: general words following specific words take their meaning from the specific words. "Cars, trucks, motorcycles, and other vehicles" — "other vehicles" means land vehicles, not aircraft.

Purposive Interpretation

Where text is ambiguous — capable of two or more reasonable meanings — the court turns to purpose to resolve the ambiguity. Purpose is determined from:

The long title of the Act: "An Act to amend and consolidate the law respecting..." Long titles can assist in identifying purpose but are not part of the operative text.

The preamble: recitals ("WHEREAS...") set out the mischief the legislature intended to address. The preamble is an internal aid to interpretation — part of the Act, but not an operative provision.

Objects clause/purpose section: modern statutes often include a dedicated purpose or objects provision. For example, the Employment Standards Act 2000s.1 states the purpose is to protect employees; the Family Law Act sets out principles for interpreting property rights. Purpose sections are strong interpretive guides but courts will not allow the purpose to override clear operative text.

Rizzo & Rizzo remains the leading case. In Rizzo, the Employment Standards Act termination and severance pay provisions were ambiguous as to whether they applied on bankruptcy. The Court used the ESA's protective purpose (employee protection) and the remedial interpretation principle to hold the provisions applied even in insolvency. Literal interpretation would have denied employees their entitlements.

Legislative History — External Aids

Legislative history refers to materials created during the enactment process:

Canadian courts follow the rule from R v Vasil [1981] 1 SCR 469 and confirmed in R v Morgentaler [1993] 3 SCR 463: legislative history is admissible to identify the mischief the legislation was designed to address, but cannot override or contradict clear statutory text.

Presumptions of Statutory Interpretation

Courts apply a number of presumptions that operate as defaults unless the statute clearly displaces them:

• •Presumption against retroactivity: statutes operate prospectively unless the legislature clearly provides for retroactive application. Retroactive statutes that affect vested rights face heightened scrutiny.
• •Presumption against Crown immunity: the Crown is not bound by statute unless clearly named or by necessary implication (Legislation Act 2006 s.71 — Ontario Crown bound if the Act clearly expresses it).
• •Strict construction of penal provisions: ambiguity in a penal provision is resolved in favour of the person subject to the penalty (in dubio pro reo). This applies to quasi-criminal regulatory offences, not just Criminal Code provisions.
• •Presumption of consistency: statutes in pari materia (on the same subject) are interpreted consistently. The Employment Standards Act and the Labour Relations Act deal with overlapping matters and are read harmoniously.
• •Presumption of constitutional validity: courts presume a statute is constitutional and will adopt an interpretation that preserves its validity if the text reasonably supports it.
• •Presumption against absurdity: an interpretation that leads to an absurd result is presumed wrong — legislatures do not intend absurd outcomes. Rizzo & Rizzo applied this reasoning to avoid denying employees their ESA entitlements.
• •Bilingual interpretation (federal legislation): where French and English versions of a federal Act differ, the common meaning of both versions is adopted, or if there is no common meaning, the version that best achieves the statute's purpose.

The Legislation Act 2006 — Ontario Rules

The Legislation Act 2006 SO 2006 c 21 Sch F governs the interpretation of all Ontario Acts and regulations. Key provisions:

• •s.64 — Remedial interpretation: "An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects."
• •s.65 — Purpose and scheme: when an Act is unclear, recourse may be had to the preamble, purpose section, and the overall scheme of the Act.
• •s.87 — Definitions and rules of construction: standard definitions for "person" (includes corporation), gender-neutral interpretation, singular/plural, and time computations.
• •s.89 — "Shall" is mandatory; "may" is permissive. Courts apply this strictly.
• •s.92 — Headings, marginal notes, and reference notes are part of the Act and may be used as aids to interpretation (Ontario rule — different from federal where headings are not operative).
• •s.104 — Regulations: a regulation is as valid as the Act under which it is made, subject to the enabling Act's constraints. Regulations inconsistent with their enabling Act are ultra vires and void.

Charter-Consistent Interpretation

Where a statute is capable of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and one of which is not, the Charter-consistent interpretation must be preferred (R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society [1992] 2 SCR 606). Courts avoid invalidating legislation when a reasonable interpretation preserves its constitutional validity.

Under R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, where a statute is found to violate a Charter right, the government may justify it under s.1 as a reasonable limitation in a free and democratic society. The Oakes test requires: (1) pressing and substantial objective; (2) proportional means (rational connection, minimal impairment, proportionality between effects and objective).

Reading in and reading down are judicial remedies for Charter violations in statutes. Reading in adds words to extend benefits to excluded groups (Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493 — sexual orientation read into Alberta human rights legislation). Reading down limits the scope of a provision to preserve its constitutional validity.

Practical Application for Ontario Counsel

• ✓Always begin with the text: identify the words at issue and their ordinary meaning, then check the Act's own definitions section before proceeding to external aids
• ✓Read the provision in its entire legislative context — surrounding sections, the Part it belongs to, the statute's structure, and related statutes in pari materia
• ✓Identify the statute's purpose from the long title, preamble, purpose section, and legislative history — use this to resolve textual ambiguity
• ✓Check the Legislation Act 2006 for Ontario-specific rules on headings, "shall"/"may," time computation, and Crown application
• ✓For regulatory arguments: cite Driedger/Rizzo, apply the three-step text-context-purpose analysis, and address any relevant presumptions of interpretation
• ✓Legislative history: pull Ontario Hansard and committee reports from the Legislative Assembly website for material amendments — note changes from prior versions